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The challenge: a new America  
 
There is widespread agreement across Europe on both the reach and the centrality of 
US power in the international system. The notion that the US is the world ‘sole superpower’ 
(or, if you prefer, a hegemon or perhaps even an imperial power) has now entered the 
popular discourse on global politics. Similarly, there is a rough consensus that in terms of 
foreign policy strategy a ‘new America’ has emerged with radical and radically different views 
on the purpose and manner in which US power is to be used: preferring unilateral action over 
multilateral co-operation; prioritising ‘hard’ over ‘soft’ power; and focusing on the ‘mad men 
and loose nukes’ or the fear and force agenda rather than the ‘holistic’ approach to security 
favoured by Europeans.  
There is a greater divergence of views in Europe on what factors are behind the new 
American strategic posture. Is it the consequence of underlying, structural forces (the power 
gap à la Kagan)? Or is it a result of systemic shifts such as the end of the Cold War? Is it 
maybe because of the neo-conservative putsch? Or is it principally about the impact of the 
September 11th attacks? Or, finally, is it principally about clashing personalities and egos? 
Like all card-carrying transatlantic analysts, I have made my modest contributions to this 
debate.1 I agree with the ‘structuralists’ who argue that changes in the past decade – inside 
America; inside Europe; and in the international system – have produced a growing gap in 
strategic perspectives, one that is likely to endure, even if the setbacks America is 
experiencing now in Iraq might reduce somewhat the hubris of the hardliners and even if a 
difference president were elected next year.  
In a nutshell, the parameters have shifted in recent years. Political America has seen 
a gradual shift away from the Atlantic seaboard towards the ‘Mountain West’ regions. The US 
has also experienced a structurally higher level of economic growth and used some of that to 
finance an extension of its military superiority, which in turn has influenced its strategic 
posture. Europe instead has chosen the on-going development of Europe as its main pre-
occupation. The trinity of ‘deepening, widening and reform’ have found their expression in the 
Euro, enlargement and the Constitution.  
Much more important, however, than these internal dynamics have been the great 
upheavals in the international landscape. First the end of the Cold War, then the September 
11th attacks moved the transatlantic agenda away from Europe to ‘managing globalised 
insecurity’. And on this global agenda, Europeans and Americans – often – do not agree. It is 
                                                          
1 See for instance Steven Everts, Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? Managing Divergence in transatlantic 
foreign policy, CER Working Paper, February 2001 and Mission impossible? See also Managing the growing 
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trite but true to say that September 11th accentuated these differences, not reduced them. In 
particular, September 11th sharpened the US debate on the utility and morality of US power; 
on the usefulness of standing alliances; and on the importance of global rules and norms to 
deal with the new threats. 
The Iraq war has subsequently reinforced these trends and impulses. ‘As the Bush 
administration sees it, the UN Security Council proved incapable of standing up to Saddam 
Hussein. The detour through multilateral diplomacy at the UN proved to be a costly debacle. 
NATO proved to be an unreliable asset, as burdensome as it was helpful. The UN and the 
EU provided platforms from which America’s friends and rivals sought to undermine its 
policies. And in the end it took American resolve and American prowess to unseat the evil 
dictator in Baghdad.’2 
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for the war sceptics. For them it confirmed the 
view of the US as an arrogant bully; prone to hyping the threats; riding roughshod over 
considerations of international law and legitimacy; unwilling to change its pre-determined 
plans in the light of circumstances or advice from allies; and singularly incapable of 
managing the messy and demanding task of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.  
 
The response, part 1: the case for clearer conditionality 
 
The problem for Europeans is that while they do agree on the fact that there is a new 
America; and while they may roughly concur on the reasons behind it; they still have wildly 
different ideas on how best to respond. The Atlanticists in Europe are ever more convinced 
that a close partnership between the US and Europe is indispensable and that the best way 
to exercise influence on US policies is to align yourself closely to US positions. Any other 
strategy would both be ineffective and dangerous. Hence Tony Blair’s repeated insistence on 
the ‘vital need for Europe and America to stay together’. Hence also Blair’s frequent warnings 
against the risks of ‘rival centres of power’ emerging. Blair has defended himself vigorously 
against accusations of being America’s poodle by saying that you cannot exert influence in 
Washington if you don’t get a seat at the table first. His overall analysis and political strategy 
is shared and supported by the governments in Madrid, the Hague, Rome, Warsaw and 
other ‘new Europe’ capitals.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
divide between Europe and the US, Award-winning essay published by the Foreign Policy Association, 
December 2002.  
2 Steven Miller, Primacy or Order? American Power and the Global System after Iraq, Paper prepared for the 
Bertelsmann Workshop on Transatlantic Relations, July 2003, pp 23-24. 
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The rival view holds that the present set of US leaders is not ‘in listening mode’. President 
Chirac, supported to varying degrees by Schroeder, Verhofstadt, Patten - and large sections of 
Europe’s public opinion – believe that the US of course welcomes support from its allies but is not 
willing to alter its strategy or share decision-making power in return. Therefore Blair is deluding 
himself if he believes he can exert influence by being ‘loyal’. Moreover, since many in this camp 
take issue with the broad thrust of this new American posture, the best thing for Europe would be 
to develop its own priorities and strategies. The minority view in this camp is to seek to ‘counter’ 
the US while the majority will emphasise the need to end the (perceived) subordination of Europe 
to US and the need for Europe to be able to act effectively and autonomously.  
In reality neither side has been terribly effective: neither Blair nor Chirac seems to have 
had much influence on US strategy. Instead what is required is for Europeans to unite behind an 
approach that puts more emphasis on the conditional nature of European support. Americans are 
never hesitant to press hard for whatever priorities they have established but Europeans find it 
exceedingly difficult to demand a quid pro quo. On a host of issues, European preferences (incl 
from the most Atlanticist countries in Europe) differ from those of America. But even Blair has not 
managed to exact much of US concessions in return for the huge political gamble he has taken. 
The same is true for other ‘new European’ countries: what do the leaders of Poland, Italy, Spain, 
the Netherlands have to show for their exceptional loyalty – apart from nice photo ops in Crawford 
or the White House?  
What is needed in Europe is a strategy of more selective assertiveness and more 
conditional support. Too often Europeans start with objecting to anything the US proposes – only 
to give in relatively soon after they discover the US is going ahead anyway (see NMD debate) and 
usually without having changed any aspect of US policy. The Americans, no fools, have noticed 
this dynamic and now many think that whatever they propose, the Europeans ‘will come round 
anyway’ (or at least some of them will, and the rest is unimportant). It is important for all of Europe 
that this perception changes. The way to achieve that is to become more selective about the 
issues on which the Europeans decide to take a stand – but then to stick to it and not to change 
unless and until certain pre-identified steps have been taken by the Americans.  
In March 2003 when Tony Blair badly needed the Labour party to back his plans for war in 
Iraq, he echoed this line of issue-linkage and conditionality: ‘What Europe should have said last 
September to the US is this. With one voice it should have said: we understand your strategic 
anxiety over terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and we will help you meet it. We will 
mean what we say in any UN resolution we pass and we will back it with action if Saddam fails to 
disarm voluntarily. However in return, Europe should have said, we ask two things of you: that the 
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US should indeed choose the UN path and you recognise the fundamental overriding importance 
of restarting the Middle East peace process, which we will hold you to. That would have been the 
right and responsible way for Europe and America to treat each other as partners, and it is a 
tragedy it has not happened.’3 
It should be clear that the growing problems of a troubled world require Europe and 
America to work together as closely as possible. If they work together there is little that Europe 
America cannot achieve. But it they pull in opposite directions, stalemate or worse inevitably 
ensues. To respond effectively to the imbalances that have crept into US grand strategy, 
European leaders should think much more clearly about which issues they wish to focus on and 
what price they wish to exact for their support for US policies. Once established at an EU level, 
they should stick to it, even when US tries to desegregate Europe.  
 
The response part 2: build up the EU-US relationship. 
 
The second part of the European answer to the new America is a focus on the 
development and reform of the US-EU relationship. It may be a European bias, but 
institutions matter. Jean Monnet, the godfather of European integration, was right when he 
emphasised the need to give a firm institutional basis to international co-operation. In his 
memoirs he famously wrote: ‘Nothing is possible without individuals; nothing is lasting 
without institutions.’4  
Existing mechanisms for transatlantic co-operation have not managed to avoid the 
train wreck over Iraq, are unsatisfactory and need to be modernised. At present there are 
three main channels; none of which is working well. Through no faults of its own, NATO has 
lost its sense of strategic purpose. NATO’s leadership in Brussels and Europe’s Atlanticist 
governments are desperately trying to prove NATO’s continuing relevance. But because of 
its outlooks and assets, NATO is ill-suited to lead the West’s fight against the new threats 
(strategic terrorism, WMD proliferation and the nexus of failed states/organised crime). 
NATO will do a lot of peacekeeping and peace support operations in the years ahead and 
work on interoperability issues and defence diplomacy. All these are important tasks. But it 
will not be the ‘real thing’, i.e. the place where the allies work to reduce the divergence in 
strategic perspectives and agree on a common agenda. The Bush administration in particular 
seems keen for NATO to take on various ‘cleaning up tasks’ but is reluctant to use NATO as 
the place to map out, jointly, a common strategy for the new threats. Rather, the watchword 
                                                          
3 House of Commons, 18 March 2003. 
4 Jean Monnet, Memoirs, Collins, London, 1978. 
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is that ‘the mission defines the coalition’. Hence NATO is the place where you ‘explain’ US 
thinking and drum up support for your plans in an ad hoc manner.  
The various sets of bilateral relationships (US-UK, US-Germany, US-France, US-
Poland etc) will likewise not be conducive for producing a common and ambitious 
transatlantic agenda, pulling in the support and assets of all concerned. The Iraq case bears 
this out. It was obvious that Europeans were themselves deeply divided over how to handle 
Iraq. But US pressure and policies (Rumsfeld’s New and Old Europe jibe) made this division 
needlessly worse. In the short term, the US is perfectly able – as it did over Iraq – to 
desegregate Europe, working with those countries that support US policies while ignoring or 
sidelining those that don’t. The trouble is that in doing so the US also ensured that the war 
sceptics used their diplomatic and other resources to thwart US strategy. The paradox is that 
US ‘divide and rule’ tactics made sure that the issue became what to do about US power 
instead of what to do about Iraq. Had the debate remained focused on Iraq and the case for 
military action, the US and Europe would not have split in the way they did. Moreover, the 
costs – to the US – of playing the desegregation game is going up: those Europeans 
governments that sided with the US have all paid a heavy political price for doing so. 
September 11th changed America. But the Iraq war changed Europe and especially the UK. 
Both ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europeans now recognise the damage done by the intra-European 
divisions over Iraq. And the price, in terms of policy adjustments, for getting future UK, 
Spanish etc support (say over Iran) will be so high that the US might as well aim to get the 
whole of Europe on board.  
By elimination, this brings us to EU-US. Clearly, this relationship does not work well 
either. It largely follows a bureaucrats’ agenda, producing endless shopping lists of common 
objectives and initiatives – but precious little scope for strategic dialogue on central issues. 
To a large extent the Europeans have themselves to blame. The system of the rotating 
presidency – a complicating irrelevancy – means that personnel and priorities shift every six 
months. Responsibility for EU external action remains split confusingly between the 
Commission, the Council and the member-states. But thankfully the Convention has agreed 
a serious of useful reforms that will streamline the EU’s external representation. A new post 
of EU Council President, an official EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and a stable head of the 
Euro Group (all in office for 2,5 years) will make it easier to have a more productive 
transatlantic dialogue. Away from the day-to-day fluctuations of EU foreign policy it is clear 
that the steady trend is towards more ‘Europe’ in that area, as is indeed the case with JHA. 
In coming years, more ‘traffic’ will have to go through EU-US. Both sides thus have a shared 
interest in making that mechanism more effective. EU-US will gradually have to grow into the 
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platform where the US and Europe conduct their strategic discussions and work out a 
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What is The Center for International Relations? 
 
The Center (Polish abbr. CSM) is an independent, non-government think tank providing advice 
and ideas on the Polish foreign policy and the key issues of international politics affecting Poland. 
CSM acts as a political consultant, permanently monitors government actions in foreign policy and 
reviews Poland’s current international position. For this purpose, we bring forth reports and 
analyses, organise conferences and seminars, publish papers and books, run research projects 
and set up thematic working groups. In the many years of our activity, we have attracted an expert 
circle of regular contributors and have provided a foreign policy discussion forum for politicians, 
parliamentarians, central and local government officials, journalists, scholars, students and 
representatives of other NGOs. We believe that the challenges of Polish foreign policy justify our 
support for the public debate on international policy issues in Poland. 
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